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FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Many of us have felt the disappointment of wanting to 
attend a concert or athletic event only to discover that the 
event has sold out.  When an artist or sports team is especially 
popular, the gap between the supply of tickets and the demand 
for those tickets can be enormous.  Some people will be able 
to attend such an event; others will not.  
  The Super Bowl is perhaps the ultimate example of an 
event where demand for tickets exceeds supply.  The two 
named plaintiffs in this case, Josh Finkelman and Ben Hoch-
Parker, wanted to attend Super Bowl XLVIII, which was held 
in New Jersey in 2014.  Finkelman bought two tickets on the 
resale market, allegedly for much more than face price.  
Hoch-Parker—confronted with the high prices in that 
market—opted not to purchase any.  Plaintiffs then brought a 
class action against the National Football League (“NFL”) 
and various affiliated entities in the District of New Jersey, 
alleging that the NFL’s ticketing practices for the Super Bowl 
violated New Jersey law.1  The District Court dismissed 
plaintiffs’ suit for failure to state a claim, and plaintiffs now 
appeal.   
 We need not grapple with the meaning of New Jersey 
                                                 
1 The other defendants include NFL Ventures, L.P., NFL 
Properties, LLC, NFL Ventures, Inc., and NFL Enterprises 
LLC.  Plaintiffs initially sued another defendant, NFL on 
Location, but later filed a stipulation voluntarily dismissing 
that defendant.  (See Appellants’ Br. at 12 n.5.)  We will refer 
to the defendants collectively as “the NFL.” 
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law in order to resolve this case.  Our inquiry is more basic.  
Just as the realities of supply and demand mean that not 
everyone who wants to attend a popular event will be able to 
do so, federal courts, too, are not open to everyone who might 
want to litigate in them.  Our courts are courts of limited 
subject matter jurisdiction, empowered by Article III of the 
Constitution to hear only “cases” and “controversies.”  Over 
time, those words have come to signify certain minimum 
requirements that are necessary to establish constitutional 
standing.  These requirements are unyielding.  Plaintiffs who 
are able to establish them will be able to sue in federal courts; 
others will not.   
 We conclude that neither Hoch-Parker nor Finkelman 
has constitutional standing to bring this case.  Were we to 
decide otherwise, anyone who purchased a Super Bowl ticket 
on the resale market would have standing to sue in federal 
court based on nothing more than conjectural assertions of 
causation and injury.  Article III requires more. 
I. Background 
 Plaintiffs rely on a rarely litigated New Jersey statute, 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-35.1 (the “Ticket Law”), which appears 
in New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act.  It says:  
It shall be an unlawful practice for a person, 
who has access to tickets to an event prior to the 
tickets’ release for sale to the general public, to 
withhold those tickets from sale to the general 
public in an amount exceeding 5% of all 
available seating for the event. 
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 The Consumer Fraud Act permits private plaintiffs to 
sue any person who violates the Act and causes them to suffer 
ascertainable damages.2  Plaintiffs assert that the NFL’s 
method of selling tickets to Super Bowl XLVIII violated the 
Ticket Law and resulted in unjust enrichment. 
 The New Jersey Legislature passed the Ticket Law in 
2002 as part of an effort to reform its statutes regulating ticket 
resale, more commonly known as “scalping.”  New Jersey has 
regulated ticket resale since at least 1983.3  In the late 1990s, 
there was an effort to reexamine the effectiveness of these 
laws, leading to the creation of a gubernatorial Ticket 
Brokering Study Commission.4  Its mission was to “compare 
the impact of a regulated and deregulated ticket resale market 
on the cost and availability of tickets to New Jersey 
entertainment events” and to consider various proposed 
                                                 
2 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8–19.  As originally drafted, the Act 
empowered only the New Jersey Attorney General to sue to 
enforce its provisions.  The Legislature amended the statute in 
1971 to permit private suits, but required private plaintiffs 
(unlike the Attorney General) to prove that they suffered an 
ascertainable loss caused by a defendant’s misconduct.  See 
Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 964 A.2d 741, 747–48 
(N.J. 2009).    
3 J.A. Vol. II at 203–04, 208–09 (N.J. Dep’t of L. & Pub. 
Safety, Div. of Consumer Affairs, Report to Governor 
Christine Todd Whitman on Access to Entertainment in New 
Jersey (Apr. 7, 1997)).   
4 J.A. Vol. II at 171–200 (Ticket Brokering Study Comm’n, 
Ticket Broker Report (Oct. 31, 2001)). 
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reforms.5 
 The Commission heard two days of testimony from a 
dozen witnesses before publishing its final report in October 
2001.  It found that, “[i]n a typical year, 90% to 95% of 
events in New Jersey do not sell out,” but getting tickets to the 
“premium events” that do sell out “is not easy.”6  The 
Commission focused heavily on “hold-backs” of tickets by 
event organizers, concluding that “[h]old-backs 
disproportionately affect the general public’s opportunity to 
obtain tickets in favor of privileged insiders,” and that the 
practice should be “eliminated or limited by statute or 
regulation.”7  The Commission therefore recommended new 
legislation to “[l]imit the number of tickets which can be held 
back from sale to the general public to 5 percent of the 
available seating in any venue or performance.”8  The 
Legislature took up the Commission’s suggestion, and 
Governor Whitman signed the bill enacting the Ticket Law on 
January 8, 2002.9   
 Since the Ticket Law’s passage, very few courts have 
grappled with its meaning.  Indeed, the parties point to only 
one case in which a New Jersey state court has interpreted the 
                                                 
5 Id. at 173. 
6 Id. at 175.  
7 Id. at 197. 
8 Id. at 191.   
9 2001 N.J. Laws 394.   
 7 
 
Law.10 
A. Factual Allegations  
 Super Bowl XLVIII took place at MetLife Stadium in 
East Rutherford, New Jersey on February 2, 2014.11  Plaintiffs 
allege that the NFL distributed 99% of Super Bowl tickets to 
NFL teams and League insiders.12  Of that amount, 75% of 
tickets allegedly went to teams, with 5% going to the host 
team, 17.5% going to each team playing in the Super Bowl, 
and 35% going to the remaining teams in the League.  The 
remaining 25% of tickets are said to have been distributed to 
“companies, broadcast networks, media sponsors, the host 
committee and other league insiders.”13  Only about 1% of 
Super Bowl tickets were available for purchase by members 
of the general public, and the only way for someone to obtain 
one of those tickets was to participate in a League-sponsored 
lottery.14  In order to acquire a ticket in the lottery, a person 
                                                 
10 Harvey v. GSAC Partners, Inc., No. L-736-03 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div., Monmouth Cnty. Mar. 21, 2003).  See 
J.A. Vol. II at 155–65 (a copy of the Harvey opinion). 
11 First. Am. Compl. (J.A. Vol. II at 76–92) ¶ 17.  In 
resolving an appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss, we 
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw 
all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor.  Hansler v. 
Lehigh Valley Hosp. Network, 798 F.3d 149, 152 n.2 
(3d Cir. 2015). 
12 First Am. Compl. ¶ 18. 
13 Id. ¶¶ 18–19. 
14 Id. ¶¶ 1, 18.  
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had to (i) enter by the deadline, (ii) be selected as a winner, 
and (iii) choose to actually purchase a ticket.15 
 Neither Hoch-Parker nor Finkelman entered the NFL’s 
ticket lottery.  Instead, on December 30, 2013, Finkelman 
purchased two tickets to the Super Bowl in the resale market 
at a price of $2,000 per ticket (which he alleges was well in 
excess of the tickets’ $800 face price).16  Hoch-Parker wanted 
to purchase five Super Bowl tickets for himself and his 
family, hoping to pay no more than $1,000 per ticket.17  He 
decided not to purchase any when, after researching the 
availability of tickets between November and December of 
2013, the only tickets he could find were for $4,200 (or 
more).18 
B. Procedural History in the District Court  
 Finkelman filed a putative class action against the NFL 
in January 2014 in the District of New Jersey.  One month 
later, he filed an amended complaint that added several 
                                                 
15 Appellees’ Br. at 34 n.13.   
16 First. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31–32.  The $800 figure appears on 
page 11 of appellants’ opening brief.  As the NFL points out, 
the First Amended Complaint does not actually allege the face 
price of tickets to Super Bowl XLVIII.  (Appellees’ Br. 
at 11 n.2.) 
17 First. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33–34.   
18 Id. ¶¶ 34–35.  The First Amended Complaint states that 
Hoch-Parker searched for tickets in 2012, but this is clearly a 
scrivener’s error.   
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defendants and identified Hoch-Parker as a second named 
plaintiff.    
 The District Court granted the NFL’s motion to 
dismiss the complaint—with prejudice—on January 20, 2015, 
in an oral decision read into the record.19  Four aspects of its 
decision merit further discussion here.       
 First, the District Court concluded that plaintiffs failed 
to plead a viable claim under the Ticket Law.  It reasoned that 
the NFL did not “withhold” any tickets to the Super Bowl 
within the meaning of the Law, but rather “distributed or 
allocated [all tickets] according to [its] existing system.”20  It 
also determined that the Ticket Law’s 5% limitation on 
withholding tickets “applies solely to tickets that are intended 
for release to the general public.”21  At most, that portion was 
the 1% of tickets sold through the NFL’s lottery—and none of 
those tickets were withheld.22  Consequently, the District 
Court decided that the NFL’s ticketing practices did not run 
afoul of the Ticket Law.  
 Second, the District Court concluded that Finkelman 
failed to plead causation under the New Jersey Consumer 
Fraud Act.  It reasoned that Finkelman’s decision not to enter 
                                                 
19 See J.A. Vol. I at 31–41.  The District Court entered an 
order granting the NFL’s motion to dismiss on January 21, 
2015.  Id. at 3.   
20 Id. at 38:2–4.  
21 Id. at 38:5–7.   
22 Id. at 38:23–39:3. 
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the NFL’s ticket lottery precluded him from proving causation 
because he could not demonstrate that he suffered any injury 
resulting from the NFL’s alleged misconduct.23  The District 
Court stated that it would be “unreasonable” for Finkelman to 
recover under the Act because he “failed to avail himself of 
the very mechanism . . . whereby his harm would have been 
avoided”—i.e., entering the lottery and possibly winning a 
face-price ticket.24  The District Court viewed the causation 
issue as a fatal pleading defect under the state statute, 
although it noted that Finkelman’s failure to enter the NFL 
ticket lottery raised “clear standing issues” under Article III.25   
 Moreover, the District Court was skeptical that 
Finkelman would be able to show causation even if he had 
entered the lottery and lost.  It noted that the tickets 
Finkelman purchased on the secondary market might well 
have been sold to him by a lottery winner who purchased 
them at face price.  The District Court stated that, if this were 
true, it would be “hard to discern any wrongdoing on the part 
of the NFL that could have served as a cause of harm of 
which Finkelman now complains.”26   
 Third, the District Court concluded that Hoch-Parker 
                                                 
23 Id. at 39:19–22.   
24 Id. at 39:22–25.   
25 Id. at 36:9–13. 
26 Id. at 40:15–18.  On appeal, Finkelman asserts that this 
scenario is impossible because the NFL requires lottery 
winners to pick up their tickets in person.  (Appellants’ Br. 
at 17 & n.8.)   
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lacked Article III standing.  In its view, having chosen not to 
purchase any Super Bowl tickets, Hoch-Parker could not 
show that he suffered any harm “beyond pure speculation or 
the merely hypothetical.”27  
 Fourth, the District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ unjust 
enrichment claim.  It reasoned that, as a quasi-contractual 
remedy, unjust enrichment requires a “sufficiently direct 
relationship” between the alleged wrongdoer and the 
plaintiff.28  Here, by contrast, the relationship between the 
plaintiffs and the NFL was “too ambiguous, remote or 
attenuated” for plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim to be 
viable.29 
II. Appellate Jurisdiction and Standard of Review  
 This is a diversity suit brought by plaintiffs under the 
Class Action Fairness Act.30  This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction over the final judgment of the District Court 
                                                 
27 J.A. Vol. I at 35:21–23. 
28 Id. at 41:8–11. 
29 Id. at 41:12–16. 
30 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). 
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.31  The District Court entered an order 
dismissing the case on January 21, 2015, and plaintiffs filed a 
notice of appeal on February 13, 2015.32  
 The Court’s review of a decision dismissing a 
complaint is plenary.33 
III. Article III Standing  
 The question we confront is whether plaintiffs have 
alleged facts which, if true, would be sufficient to establish 
Article III standing.  
 We begin by noting that our inquiry is more searching 
than the one originally contemplated by the parties.  In its 
principal brief, the NFL asked this Court to affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of Hoch-Parker’s claims on standing 
grounds, but, with respect to Finkelman, focused exclusively 
                                                 
31 Of course, notwithstanding the presence of statutory 
appellate jurisdiction, our conclusion that the named plaintiffs 
lack Article III standing means that we do not have subject 
matter jurisdiction to reach the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.  
See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 
101–02 (1998) (“For a court to pronounce upon the meaning 
or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no 
jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act 
ultra vires.”). 
32 J.A. Vol. I at 1–2. 
33 Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 452 
(3d Cir. 2006). 
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on the viability of plaintiffs’ claim under the Ticket Law.  In 
litigating the appeal this way, the NFL was following the lead 
of the District Court, which concluded that Finkelman failed 
to allege causation under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud 
Act.  In doing so, the District Court noted that Finkelman’s 
failure to enter the NFL ticket lottery raised “certain standing 
issues,” but decided “the issue [was] more properly 
examined” in the context of New Jersey law “as opposed to 
standing.”34 
 We must take a different approach.  A federal court’s 
obligation to assure itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction 
over a claim is antecedent to its power to reach the merits of 
that claim.35  To that end, even when appellees do not address 
standing, we must determine on our own whether standing 
exists.36  Cognizant of our “bedrock obligation to examine 
[our] own subject matter jurisdiction,” we therefore asked the 
parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing standing.37  
A. The Minimum Requirements of Article III 
Standing  
 To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate “(1) an injury-in-fact, (2) a sufficient causal 
                                                 
34 J.A. Vol. I at 36:2–13. 
35 Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 
U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007).   
36 Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 134 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001). 
37 Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium 
Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 117 (3d Cir. 1997).   
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connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, 
and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision.”38 
 To allege the first element, injury-in-fact, a plaintiff 
must claim “the invasion of a concrete and particularized 
legally protected interest” resulting in harm “that is actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”39  To be 
“concrete,” an injury must be “real, or distinct and palpable, 
as opposed to merely abstract.”40  To be sufficiently 
“particularized,” an injury must “affect the plaintiff in a 
personal and individual way.”41  Plaintiffs do not allege an 
injury-in-fact when they rely on a “chain of contingencies” or 
“mere speculation.”42 
                                                 
38 Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 
358-59 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted and 
punctuation modified) (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. 
Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014)).   
39 Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 278 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560 (1992)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1738 (2015). 
40 N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. President of the United States, 653 
F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983), and Whitmore v. Arkansas, 
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
41 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1.  
42 Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 364 
(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 
S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013)).   
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 The second element of Article III standing is causation.  
This element requires the alleged injury to be “fairly traceable 
to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of 
the independent action of some third party not before the 
court.”43  This requirement is “akin to ‘but for’ causation” in 
tort and may be satisfied “even where the conduct in question 
might not have been a proximate cause of the harm.”44  An 
“indirect causal relationship will suffice,” provided that “there 
is a ‘fairly traceable connection between the alleged injury in 
fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant.’”45 
 Finally, the plaintiff must establish redressability.  This 
requires the plaintiff to show that it is “likely, as opposed to 
merely speculative,” that the alleged injury will be redressed 
by a favorable decision.46 
 The burden to establish standing rests with the 
plaintiffs.47  The manner in which plaintiffs go about 
                                                 
43 Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 
137-38 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. at 560).  
44 Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 725 F.3d 406, 
418 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 
354, 360–61 (3d Cir. 2000)).   
45 Toll Bros., 555 F.3d at 142 (quoting Vt. Agency of Natural 
Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 
(2000)). 
46 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
47 Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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satisfying that burden depends on the posture of the case.  The 
Supreme Court has said that “each element [of standing] must 
be supported in the same way as any other matter on which 
the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner 
and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of 
the litigation.”48  When assessing standing on the basis of the 
facts alleged in a complaint, this means we apply the same 
standard of review we use when assessing a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim.49 
 We have described this inquiry as a three-step process.  
First, we “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to 
state a claim”—here, the three elements of Article III 
standing.50  Second, we eliminate from consideration any 
allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, 
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”51  Third, “where 
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [we] assume their 
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly” establish 
the prerequisites of standing.52  In conducting this analysis, 
we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s teaching that all 
aspects of a complaint must rest on “well-pleaded factual 
                                                 
48 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561. 
49 In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer 
Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). 
50 Id. (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 
130 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
51 Id.  
52 Id. 
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allegations” and not “mere conclusory statements.”53  Thus, to 
survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, a plaintiff 
“must allege facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that 
it has standing to sue.”54  Speculative or conjectural assertions 
are not sufficient.55 
                                                 
53 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) 
(discussing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).  
54 Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 671 F.3d 140, 
145 (2d Cir. 2011). 
55 Schering Plough, 678 F.3d at 248 (rejecting the 
sufficiency of an allegation that rested on “pure conjecture”).   
Some of our sister circuits have questioned how well the 
“plausibility” standard of Iqbal and Twombly maps onto 
standing doctrine.  See, e.g., Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 
1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011)  (“We simply note that Twombly 
and Iqbal deal with a fundamentally different issue, and that 
the court’s focus should be on the jurisprudence that deals 
with constitutional standing.”); Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A. 
(USA), 524 F.3d 217, 225 (2d Cir. 2008) (“However, 
plausibility is not at issue at this point, as we are considering 
only Article III standing.”).   
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 Absent standing on the part of the named plaintiffs, we 
must dismiss a putative class action for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.56  As will become apparent, we have no choice 
but to do so here.   
B. Hoch-Parker Does Not Allege an Article III 
Injury  
 The District Court concluded that Hoch-Parker lacks 
Article III standing because he never purchased a ticket to the 
Super Bowl, meaning that he suffered no out-of-pocket loss 
and, in the District Court’s view, no injury-in-fact.  This is 
                                                                                                             
 
Without wading too deeply into this particular thicket, we 
are content to say that, even when reviewing only the bare 
allegations of a complaint, Iqbal and Twombly teach that 
standing cannot rest on mere “legal conclusions” or “naked 
assertions.”  David v. Alphin, 704 F.3d 327, 333 
(4th Cir. 2013); see also Maya, 658 F.3d at 1068 (a plaintiff 
cannot “rely on a bare legal conclusion to assert injury-in-fact, 
or engage in an ingenious academic exercise in the 
conceivable to explain how defendants’ actions caused his 
injury”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Morse v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[A] 
court need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal 
conclusions’ when deciding a motion to dismiss.”). 
56 Neale, 794 F.3d at 362 (“[T]he ‘cases or controversies’ 
requirement is satisfied so long as a class representative has 
standing.”). 
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plainly correct.57  Injuries-in-fact must be “particularized” in 
the sense of “affect[ing] the plaintiff in a personal and 
individual way.”58  Because Hoch-Parker never purchased a 
ticket on the secondary market, he suffered no more injury 
than any of the possibly tens of thousands of people who 
thought about purchasing a ticket to the Super Bowl and 
chose not to.  Nor does Hoch-Parker allege an “actual” injury, 
as opposed to one that is “conjectural or hypothetical.”59  
Because he chose not to purchase any tickets, the amount of 
any damages Hoch-Parker might have suffered due to the 
NFL’s alleged misconduct is completely indeterminate.  
 Perhaps sensing the weakness of his claim to have 
suffered an injury-in-fact, Hoch-Parker tries to recast his 
injury as the “lost opportunity” he suffered when he was 
unable to attend the Super Bowl.  He cites our decision in 
Howard v. New Jersey Department of Civil Service in support 
of that assertion.60  We find this “lost opportunity” argument 
completely unpersuasive.  Indeed, any analogy between 
Howard and the circumstances here is, at best, extremely 
strained.   
                                                 
57 Even plaintiffs’ counsel “conceded” at oral argument that 
the question of whether Hoch-Parker has standing is a 
“troubling,” “troublesome,” and “difficult issue.”  Oral Arg. 
Recording at 1:42, 5:35, 6:46, available at 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/15-
1435Finkelmanv.NationalFootball.mp3.     
58 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1.  
59 Id. at 560 (quotation marks omitted). 
60 667 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir 1981). 
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 The Howard plaintiffs alleged that the physical agility 
test then required of applicants to become police officers in 
Newark discriminated on the basis of sex.61  In assessing 
whether the plaintiffs had standing, the Court concluded that 
the alleged loss of the opportunity to obtain a job with the 
police force was sufficient to make out an injury-in-fact.62  Of 
course, the Howard plaintiffs had already entered a 
competitive application process that they claimed was 
derailed by unconstitutional conduct on the part of state 
actors.  Hoch-Parker, by contrast, merely “researched the 
availability of tickets” for the Super Bowl.63  He took no 
meaningful action to pursue the “opportunity” to attend the 
game at all.   
 Moreover, Hoch-Parker completely glosses over the 
Howard Court’s actual resolution of the standing issue in that 
case.  Since the Howard plaintiffs “were refused employment 
because they failed the initial written examination, not 
because they failed the physical agility test,” the Court 
concluded that they lacked standing because they could not 
show any “causal connection between the claimed injury (loss 
of job opportunity) and the challenged conduct (use of the 
physical agility test).”64  Hoch-Parker faces the same 
causation problem.  Demand for Super Bowl tickets was so 
great that Hoch-Parker might have been unable to obtain any 
tickets at his preferred price even if the NFL had made all 
                                                 
61 Id. at 1100–01. 
62 Id. at 1101. 
63 First Am. Compl. ¶ 34. 
64 667 F.2d at 1101. 
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tickets to the Super Bowl available to members of the general 
public.  As in Howard, there is thus an insufficient connection 
between Hoch-Parker’s claimed injury (the loss of an 
opportunity to attend the Super Bowl) and the challenged 
conduct (withholding of tickets). 
 Our conclusion that Hoch-Parker lacks standing is not 
a hard call.  If the Court were to credit Hoch-Parker’s concept 
of injury, everyone who contemplated buying a Super Bowl 
ticket but decided against it would have standing to bring a 
claim under the Ticket Law.  Article III is simply not that 
expansive.65 
                                                 
65 Hoch-Parker suggests that the Supreme Court may decide 
in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins that “naked statutory violations” are 
sufficient to confer Article III standing and encourages us to 
consider the “direct application” of Spokeo to this case.  
(Appellants’ Ltr. to Ct. at 6 (Sept. 29, 2015).)  The Supreme 
Court there granted certiorari to address the question of 
“[w]hether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a 
plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore 
could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, 
by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare 
violation of a federal statute.”  Supreme Court, No. 13-1339, 
Question Presented, http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/13-
01339qp.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). We need not wait 
for an opinion in Spokeo to decide that Hoch-Parker lacks 
standing.   
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 Accordingly, we will uphold the District Court’s 
dismissal of Hoch-Parker’s Ticket Law claim for lack of 
                                                                                                             
 
As an initial matter, Spokeo involves the assertion of 
standing absent a showing of “concrete harm.”  The question 
presented does not address the separate requirement that an 
Article III injury must be sufficiently “particularized.”  
Having chosen not to purchase a Super Bowl ticket, Hoch-
Parker asserts no particularized harm at all. 
Second, Spokeo concerns the limits that Article III places on 
Congress’s ability to create a statutory cause of action.  It 
does not address the separate issue of whether a state 
legislature can elevate harms to the status of Article III 
injuries in the context of diversity jurisdiction.  That issue 
raises serious federalism concerns absent from the Spokeo 
case. 
Third, Hoch-Parker’s Spokeo argument is ultimately futile.  
Whatever the contours of Article III, the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act only permits a private plaintiff to sue 
when that plaintiff has suffered an “ascertainable loss of 
moneys or property.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19.  Although we 
do not reach the merits of Hoch-Parker’s claims, we 
nonetheless observe that Hoch-Parker nowhere explains how, 
even if constitutional standing can rest on a bare statutory 
violation, he would have statutory standing absent the kind of 
injury that New Jersey law requires. 
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Article III standing.66   
C. Finkelman Does Not Allege an Article III 
Injury  
 We also conclude that Finkelman has failed to allege 
facts which, if true, would be sufficient to establish Article III 
standing.  
 The complaint purports to bring a class action on 
behalf of “all persons who paid for . . . tickets to Super Bowl 
XLVIII in excess of the printed ticket price” and alleges that 
class members “suffered ascertainable losses consisting of the 
purchase price of the ticket in excess of the face value.”67  
Whereas Hoch-Parker never purchased any tickets, we will 
assume that Finkelman purchased two $2,000 tickets with an 
original face price of $800 each.68  The question is whether 
this $2,400 difference—or any portion of it—amounts to an 
injury-in-fact caused by the NFL’s alleged misconduct. 
                                                 
66 The complaint is somewhat ambiguous as to whether 
plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim is brought in the name of 
Finkelman, Hoch-Parker, or both.  Because that claim alleges 
that “[p]laintiffs and the putative Class paid an amount for 
tickets that exceed [sic] the value of the tickets” (First. Am. 
Compl. ¶ 53), and since Hoch-Parker paid nothing for any 
tickets, we will construe the unjust enrichment claim as being 
brought by Finkelman as the sole class representative. 
67 Id. ¶¶ 38, 50.   
68 See supra note 16.   
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 In exploring this question, we are cognizant of the fact 
that “[t]he choice among alternative definitions of the injury 
may control the determination of causation.”69  We will 
therefore examine the allegations in the complaint from a 
number of different angles to see if Finkelman’s purported 
injury can be framed in a way that satisfies Article III.   
1. Theory One:  The NFL’s Alleged 
Misconduct Prevented Finkelman 
from Purchasing a Face-Price Ticket 
 One way to understand Finkelman’s claim is that, but 
for the NFL’s withholding of more than 5% of Super Bowl 
tickets from sale to the general public, he would have been 
able to buy such a ticket at face price.  In view of the facts 
alleged in the complaint, however, Finkelman has not 
adequately asserted that his inability to buy a face-price ticket 
is fairly traceable to any actions by the NFL. 
 In order to explain why causation is such a difficult 
issue in this case, it is helpful to start with an example.  
Imagine that there are ten people in line to attend a concert at 
a venue with only ten seats.  It turns out, unbeknownst to the 
would-be ticket buyers, that the event organizer has violated 
the Ticket Law by withholding 50% of tickets for corporate 
insiders.  The first five people in line are able to buy a ticket 
at face price, but just as the sixth person reaches the ticket 
counter, the clerk puts a “SOLD OUT” sign in the window 
and turns off the lights.  The sixth person in line then (i) buys 
                                                 
69 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3531.5 
(3d ed. 2008). 
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a ticket from one of the five insiders in the resale market at a 
price higher than face value, and (ii) sues the event organizer 
under the Ticket Law.  She seeks, as damages, the difference 
between the face price of the ticket and the higher price she 
actually paid.  
 In this scenario, our plaintiff should have no trouble 
alleging that she suffered an injury-in-fact fairly traceable to 
the defendant’s conduct.  But for the defendant’s illegal 
withholding, our plaintiff—as the sixth person in line—would 
have been able to buy a ticket at face price.70    
 This example reflects the same theory that Finkelman 
proffers here.  He seeks as damages the difference between 
the $800 face price of Super Bowl tickets and the $2,000 
price he paid in the resale market.71  But while this theory of 
recovery works very well as applied to our hypothetical, it 
completely falls apart in relation to Finkelman.   
 The problem is that Finkelman failed to enter the 
                                                 
70 One might also ask whether the eleventh person in line 
would have standing.  It seems clear to us that if the defendant 
in such a case could show that (i) there were only ten tickets 
available, and (ii) the plaintiff was the eleventh person in line, 
and then moved for dismissal on causation grounds, the 
district court would have no choice but to dismiss the case for 
lack of standing.     
71 Indeed, presumably Finkelman actually seeks more than 
this difference as damages.  The Consumer Fraud Act 
mandates that successful plaintiffs receive treble damages and 
attorneys’ fees and costs.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8–19. 
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NFL’s ticket lottery.  Irrespective of whether the NFL 
withheld tickets in violation of the Ticket Law—a question 
we do not reach here—Finkelman chose to buy his tickets on 
the secondary market.  As a result, there was always a zero 
percent chance that he could procure a face-price ticket.  In 
this sense, any harm that Finkelman suffered is properly 
attributed not to the NFL, but rather to his own decision not to 
enter the ticket lottery.72   
                                                 
72 We note that Finkelman’s inability to obtain a face-price 
ticket in the resale market is itself a consequence of the 
incredibly high demand for Super Bowl tickets.  Since 95% of 
entertainment events in New Jersey do not sell out, see supra 
note 6, it is almost never clear ahead of time whether buying 
tickets to an event with the plan to resell them for a profit will 
be a good investment.  Ticket brokers therefore “assume the 
risk of not being able to sell [their] tickets.”  Stephen Happel 
& Marianne M. Jennings, The Eight Principles of the 
Microeconomic and Regulatory Future of Ticket Scalping, 
Ticket Brokers, and Secondary Ticket Markets, 28 J.L. & 
Com. 115, 129 (2010). 
Thus, for most events, a fan might be able to obtain a ticket 
for face price (or less!) from a broker desperate to recoup 
some portion of his or her investment in the waning moments 
before an event begins.  Here, by contrast, plaintiffs assert 
that the demand for Super Bowl tickets is so overwhelming 
that, once in the secondary market, a fan “must pay 
substantially more than the ticket’s face value.”  (First Am. 
Compl. ¶ 1 (emphasis added).)  Plaintiffs therefore agree:  
once Finkelman chose not to enter the lottery, it was 
impossible for him to pay face price for a ticket. 
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 Finkelman tries to rebut this view by arguing that it 
would be unfair to require him to have entered the lottery in 
order to assert standing.  As Finkelman puts it, such a ruling 
would “amount to no less than conditioning Plaintiffs’ 
standing to seek redress for Defendants’ unlawful conduct 
upon their participation in the very wrongdoing they seek to 
challenge.”73  Though this argument may have some intuitive 
appeal, it ultimately misses the mark.    
 Finkelman is of course correct that the law does not 
always require a plaintiff to participate in some allegedly 
unlawful practice in order to bring a lawsuit challenging that 
practice.74  Even so, the obstacle facing Finkelman is more 
fundamental.  The causation element of standing requires a 
plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to show that his or her injury 
is “fairly traceable” to the alleged wrongdoing of the 
defendant.75  We have explained that traceability requires, at a 
minimum, that the defendant’s purported misconduct was a 
“but for” cause of the plaintiff’s injury.76  And, if we treat 
Finkelman’s injury-in-fact as his inability to obtain face-price 
tickets to the Super Bowl, that injury is simply not traceable 
                                                 
73 Appellants’ Br. at 36.   
74 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489–91 (2010) (describing 
circumstances in which district courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider a challenge to an administrative 
adjudication even when the agency action has not yet 
terminated).   
75 Toll Bros., 555 F.3d at 142. 
76 See Edmonson, 725 F.3d at 418. 
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to the NFL’s withholding of tickets given that Finkelman 
sought tickets only in the resale market.77   
 Any other conclusion is untenable.  Were we to adopt 
Finkelman’s view of standing, anyone who bought a Super 
Bowl ticket from a reseller could sue the NFL to recover 
three-times the difference between the purchase price and 
face price.78  One might ask:  what if the only ticket 
Finkelman could find was on sale for $10,000?  Or $15,000?  
Or $20,000?  No matter.  On the theory of injury articulated in 
plaintiffs’ complaint, everyone who bought a resold ticket 
could sue the NFL for any costs above face price, irrespective 
of having chosen not to enter the ticket lottery.  Because this 
theory of standing fails to account for the need to show a 
causal connection between plaintiffs’ alleged injury and the 
NFL’s conduct, we have no choice but to reject it. 
 Indeed, Finkelman’s standing difficulties would likely 
be insuperable even if the NFL had committed only a de 
minimis violation of the Ticket Law by distributing 6% of 
tickets to League insiders and selling 94% of tickets to 
members of the general public on a first-come, first-served 
                                                 
77 One might argue that, even if Finkelman cannot allege 
that the NFL prevented him from obtaining a face-price ticket, 
the NFL’s alleged withholding of tickets perhaps diminished 
his chances of acquiring a face-price ticket.  Here again, 
though, Finkelman runs into the problem that he failed to 
enter the ticket lottery.  His chance of obtaining a face-price 
ticket was always zero. 
78 See supra note 71 (discussing mandatory damages under 
the Consumer Fraud Act). 
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basis.  Unless Finkelman could allege facts indicating that, as 
in our hypothetical, he was one of the “next people in line,” 
demand for Super Bowl tickets so far exceeds supply that 
Finkelman’s probability of obtaining a face-price ticket in a 
public sale would have been effectively nil regardless of the 
NFL’s ticketing practices.  Any argument that Finkelman 
could have procured a face-price ticket to the Super Bowl—at 
least on the facts alleged in the complaint before us—is 
ultimately conjectural and speculative.  It is, in short, 
precisely the kind of allegation that cannot sustain Article III 
standing.79    
 Consequently, Finkelman has failed to allege standing 
on the theory that, but for the NFL’s alleged withholding, he 
would have been able to purchase a face-price ticket. 
2. Theory Two:  Finkelman Paid a 
Higher Price in the Resale Market Due 
to the NFL’s Withholding of Tickets   
 We will also consider another way of framing the 
Article III injury in this case—one emphasized by plaintiffs’ 
counsel at oral argument.  Instead of thinking of Finkelman’s 
injury as his inability to acquire a face-price ticket, we might 
focus instead on the increased price he allegedly paid for his 
tickets on the resale market.  In other words, it may be the 
case that, but for the NFL’s alleged wrongdoing, the price 
Finkelman paid for a resold ticket would have been cheaper.  
This argument relies on the basic principle that “[a] reduction 
                                                 
79 See Blunt, 767 F.3d at 278; Aichele, 757 F.3d at 364. 
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in supply will cause prices to rise.”80  One might suppose that 
if the NFL were withholding Super Bowl tickets, its behavior 
would have had the effect of decreasing the supply of tickets 
in the resale market and driving up those tickets’ prices.   
 To give a concrete example, imagine that, for a given 
event, the face price of a ticket is $100 and its price on the 
resale market is $200.  If we assume that an event organizer’s 
illegal withholding drives up the price on the resale market, it 
may be that, but for the withholding, the price on the resale 
market would have been $180.  In this example, a plaintiff’s 
injury-in-fact is not $100 (the difference between the face 
price and the resale price), but $20 (the difference between 
the resale price with and without the defendant’s illegal 
withholding).   
 In conceptualizing Finkelman’s injury this way, we 
recognize that the First Amended Complaint did not allege 
this theory of harm as clearly as it could have.  Indeed, 
Finkelman primarily sought as damages “the purchase price 
of the ticket in excess of the face value.”81  Nonetheless, 
drawing all reasonable inferences in Finkelman’s favor, we 
find that he sufficiently raised this price-inflation theory of 
injury below.  We will therefore consider the argument that 
his Article III injury is not the $1,200 premium he paid per 
ticket, but rather some unspecified portion of that amount 
attributable to the NFL’s alleged withholding.   
                                                 
80 In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 152 
(3d Cir. 2002). 
81 First Am. Compl. ¶ 50.  
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 At first blush, this might seem to be a promising way 
for Finkelman to establish standing.  But there is a problem.  
Demand for tickets to the Super Bowl is so high that those 
tickets command, on plaintiffs’ own telling, several times 
their face price in the resale market.82  Assuming that 
Finkelman is correct that the NFL allocated some 99% of 
Super Bowl tickets to League insiders, those insiders had the 
same incentive to resell their tickets as the unnamed broker 
who sold Finkelman his two tickets:  they could make an 
enormous profit by doing so.  Thus, while it might be the case 
that the NFL’s withholding increased ticket prices on the 
resale market, it might also be the case that it had no effect on 
the resale market.83   
 Indeed, on the facts alleged here, withholding tickets 
from the general public and distributing them to League 
insiders might have even increased the supply of tickets on 
the resale market, leading to lower prices.  The complaint 
never specifies whether the NFL insiders who received the 
vast majority of Super Bowl tickets had to pay for those 
tickets in the first instance.  Now, compare two potential 
ticket resellers.  The first, an individual fan, could resell his or 
her ticket and pocket as profit the difference between the 
                                                 
82 See id. ¶ 27 (alleging that tickets for the 2013 Super Bowl 
with a face price of $600 sold in the secondary market for 
$3,000); id. ¶ 35 (alleging that Hoch-Parker could not find a 
ticket to the 2014 Super Bowl for less than $4,200).   
83 See Happel & Jennings, The Eight Principles of the 
Microeconomic and Regulatory Future of Ticket Scalping, 28 
J.L. & Com. at 162 (explaining that held-back tickets “do 
make their way into secondary markets”).   
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resale price and the up-front cost of the ticket.  The second, a 
League insider who received a ticket for free, could make 
even more money by pocketing the entire resale price of the 
ticket as profit.  For this reason, League insiders might have 
been especially eager to resell their tickets—meaning that the 
NFL’s ticket distribution practices may have actually 
increased the number of ticket sellers in the secondary 
market.  Since an increase in supply leads to lower prices, it is 
entirely possible that Finkelman was able to a buy a ticket for 
less money than if members of the general public had been 
able to purchase 95% of all tickets in the first instance. 
 To state the problem succinctly:  we have no way of 
knowing whether the NFL’s withholding of tickets would 
have had the effect of increasing or decreasing prices on the 
secondary market.  We can only speculate—and speculation is 
not enough to sustain Article III standing. 
 This conclusion may seem counterintuitive.  After all, 
Finkelman is pursuing a simple price inflation theory based on 
the relationship between supply and demand in the ticket 
resale market, and federal courts typically credit allegations of 
injury that involve no more than “application of basic 
economic logic.”84  But there is a difference between 
allegations that stand on well-pleaded facts and allegations 
that stand on nothing more than supposition.   
 In explaining that difference, it may be helpful to 
compare failure to allege an Article III injury with failure to 
state a plausible claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  The Supreme 
                                                 
84 United Transp. Union v. I.C.C., 891 F.2d 908, 912 n.7 
(D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly is the touchstone.  
The plaintiffs there, who purported to represent a class of 
telephone and high-speed Internet service subscribers, alleged 
that the companies that provided these services had conspired 
to minimize competition and to inflate service charges.85  So 
far, so good:  a person who claims to have paid inflated prices 
resulting from an antitrust conspiracy clearly alleges an 
Article III injury.  Where plaintiffs fell short was in alleging 
facts that would lead to the plausible inference that the 
defendants had entered a conspiracy at all.  The complaint 
focused only on defendants’ “parallel conduct,” and parallel 
conduct, standing alone, is not necessarily “suggestive of 
conspiracy.”86  Because plaintiffs’ allegations were not 
sufficient to “nudge[] their claims across the line from 
conceivable to plausible,” they failed to state a claim under 
Rule 12(b)(6).87 
 It is thus fair to say that, in Twombly, the plaintiffs 
looked around and saw conduct consistent with a conspiracy, 
but they saw no facts that indicated more plausibly that a 
conspiracy actually existed.  Finkelman’s situation is 
different.  Given the NFL’s ticket distribution practices, he 
knows precisely how the NFL allegedly violated the law.  But 
when it comes to injury, he looks only to the difference 
between a ticket’s $800 face price and the price he paid and 
says, “I have a strong suspicion that this ticket would have 
been cheaper if more tickets had been available for purchase 
                                                 
85 550 U.S. at 550.   
86 Id. at 568. 
87 Id. at 570. 
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by members of the general public.”  That claim rests on no 
additional facts at all.  It is pure conjecture about what the 
ticket resale market might have looked like if the NFL had 
sold its tickets differently.  Article III injuries require a firmer 
foundation.   
 The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Dominguez v. UAL 
Corp. provides a helpful point of comparison.88  The plaintiff 
there sued United Air Lines under the federal antitrust laws, 
asserting that United’s prohibition on reselling airplane tickets 
deprived him of a secondary market in which he might have 
been able to purchase tickets for less money than he paid 
United.89  While the district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the defendant, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the 
district court should have dismissed the case for lack of 
Article III standing.   
 The D.C. Circuit reached this conclusion even though 
the plaintiff had introduced testimony from an expert who 
surveyed United’s customers and concluded that “a high 
percentage of respondents would consider using a feature that 
allowed them to legally sell or give away airline tickets they 
are unable to use.”90  In the plaintiff’s view, this was 
sufficient to show that United’s prohibition on a secondary 
market for airplane tickets caused him an injury-in-fact.  The 
D.C. Circuit disagreed.  It noted that the plaintiff’s expert had 
failed to take into account the costs of changing United’s 
                                                 
88 666 F.3d 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
89 Id. at 1360–61. 
90 Id. at 1363. 
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reservation system, the possible introduction of new, seller-
imposed fees, and myriad other factors that might influence 
prices in a hypothetical resale market.  Thus, the plaintiff 
could not show “that any secondary market would have led to 
a lower price than what [the plaintiff] paid,” and the absence 
of a plausible injury-in-fact required dismissal.91   
 Dominguez illustrates the intractable standing 
problems that may arise when a lawsuit rests on allegations 
about a hypothetical resale market.  Like the plaintiff in that 
case, Finkelman only can speculate as to whether, absent the 
NFL’s withholding, the prices he paid in the resale market 
would have been cheaper.  He has to guess.  In the final 
analysis, Article III requires more than this kind of 
conjecture.92   
 To be fair, one might point out that Dominguez was 
handed down after discovery had concluded, whereas 
Finkelman has not had a chance to introduce evidence that 
might more fully flesh out his theories of injury and causation.  
                                                 
91 Id.  
92 We emphasize that Finkelman’s standing issues arise from 
an unusual combination of factors, including reliance on 
claims about a hypothetical resale market and the NFL’s 
idiosyncratic ticketing practices.  In the mine run of cases, 
where a complaint alleges that the defendant committed an 
unlawful act that caused a traditional injury, the most 
plausible inference will be that the plaintiff sustained an 
Article III injury.  The amount of damages is then a question 
of proof.  Here, by contrast, the complaint does not permit the 
plausible inference that Finkelman suffered any injury at all.   
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Indeed, at oral argument, his counsel suggested that he had an 
economist ready to testify that the NFL’s withholding of 
tickets increased the price that Finkelman paid in the resale 
market.93   
 We are of course mindful that, “[a]t the pleading stage, 
general factual allegations of injury resulting from the 
defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss 
we presume that general allegations embrace those specific 
facts that are necessary to support the claim.”94  But we have 
been careful to note that, even at the pleading stage, “we need 
not accept as true unsupported conclusions and unwarranted 
inferences.”95  Insofar as we construe the complaint to allege 
that Finkelman paid more for his tickets than he would have 
absent the NFL’s alleged misconduct, that contention is a 
“bald assertion” unsupported by well-pleaded facts.96  Nor are 
we persuaded by plaintiffs’ counsel’s promises of future 
expert testimony when no facts supporting plaintiffs’ theory 
                                                 
93 Oral Arg. Recording at 23:26–24:07. 
94 Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 
256 (1994) (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561).   
95 Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 500 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
96 Morse, 132 F.3d at 906. 
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of injury appear within the four corners of the complaint.97   
 We conclude that Finkelman’s difficulties in alleging 
an injury-in-fact are insurmountable.  Because the District 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to reach the merits of 
plaintiffs’ claims, we will therefore vacate its dismissal of 
Finkelman’s Ticket Law and unjust enrichment claims under 
Rule 12(b)(6).98 
                                                 
97 In its current posture, this case does not require us to 
consider the correct result if plaintiffs’ counsel had included 
allegations about his proffered expert in the complaint itself.  
We simply note that, in circumstances where the sufficiency 
of an allegation regarding an injury-in-fact is contested at the 
motion to dismiss stage, district courts have numerous 
procedural devices available to them to satisfy themselves of 
their Article III jurisdiction.  See In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining 
that a district court may convert a motion to dismiss into one 
for summary judgment, provided that all parties receive a 
“reasonable opportunity” to present relevant evidence); 
Doherty v. Rutgers Sch. of Law-Newark, 651 F.2d 893, 
898 n.6 (3d Cir. 1981) (district courts, when assessing pre-
discovery challenges to standing, may consider plaintiffs’ 
affidavits or conduct preliminary evidentiary hearings).   
98 While standing arises on a claim-by-claim basis, 
Finkelman alleges the same injury for purposes of his Ticket 
Law and unjust enrichment claims.  We therefore need not 
engage in a “claim-by-claim” discussion of standing.  Toll 
Bros., 555 F.3d at 138 n.5. 
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IV. Conclusion  
 The threshold requirements of standing are “moored in 
the constitutional principle that the judiciary’s power only 
extends to cases or controversies.”99  In reaching our 
conclusions in this case, we neither interpret the Ticket Law’s 
meaning nor pass judgment on future Ticket Law claims.  The 
New Jersey Attorney General can always sue to enforce the 
Law, and the courts of New Jersey remain open to such suits.  
But Hoch-Parker and Finkelman chose to sue in federal court, 
and their failure to allege the elements of standing means that 
we lack jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims.   
 We will therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment 
with respect to Hoch-Parker and vacate the District Court’s 
judgment with respect to Finkelman.  Because the NFL did 
not raise the issue of Finkelman’s Article III standing before 
the District Court,100 we will dismiss this appeal without 
prejudice for lack of jurisdiction and remand to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.101  
                                                 
99 Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 
232 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
100 See NFL Mem. of Law, Case No. 14-cv-96 (PGS), ECF 
No. 19-1 (discussing standing in relation to Hoch-Parker but 
not Finkelman); NFL Reply Mem., ECF No. 50 (same).     
101 See Pa. Prison Soc’y v. Cortes, 508 F.3d 156, 169 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (dismissing an appeal without prejudice for lack of 
jurisdiction when, “[b]ecause the issue of standing was raised 
for the first time on appeal, none of the plaintiffs have had the 
opportunity to present evidence or to litigate this issue.”). 
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On remand, the District Court may exercise its discretion as to 
whether plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend their 
complaint.102   
                                                 
102 See Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Harrison, 
907 F.2d 1408, 1418 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a district 
court may consider a motion to file an amended complaint 
when the earlier complaint fails to adequately allege 
standing). 
